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SECTION 230 IMMUNITY: HOW THE TRUMP ERA HAS EXPOSED
THE CURRENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN CLAUSE IN THE MODERN PUBLIC
SQUARE
Brandon Salter and Dhillon Ramkhelawan*
“My use of social media is not Presidential—it’s MODERN DAY
PRESIDENTIAL.”
Donald J. Trump, President of the United States1

I. INTRODUCTION
The claim above from the President of the United States in reference to
his Twitter account is essentially the grounds for which the Knight First
Amendment Institute at Columbia Univ. v. Trump brought forth a lawsuit.2
The lawsuit brought issues on free speech, particularly those on social media
platforms, to the forefront of First Amendment jurisprudence. Judge Buchwald ruled President Trump’s use of the Twitter comment box was an interactive space in an intermediary platform and it created a designated public
forum.3 The government creates a designated public forum when it intentionally opens a nontraditional forum for public discourse.4 As a result, the
decision forced the President to unblock the seven twitter plaintiffs in the
lawsuit “for barring them from viewing or responding to his tweets.”5
This lawsuit has exposed the current conflict between the fundamental
right to free speech under the First Amendment and the “Good Samaritan”
clause within Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act when it

* Brandon Salter, LL.M Candidate, University of Washington School of Law; J.D.,
Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law. Dhillon Ramkhlelawan, J.D., Barry
University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; MMgt. Schulich School of Business; B.A.
York University.
1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 1, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/881281755017355264?lang=en.
2. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
3. Id. at 575.
4. Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 496 (9th Cir.
2015).
5. Charlie Savage, White House Unblocks Twitter Users Who Sued Trump, But Appeals
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/us/politics/trumptwitter-account-lawsuit.html.
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comes to regulating content published on the internet. The two provisions of
the “Good Samaritan” clause within section 230 are as follows:
(c)(1) No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.6
(c)(2) No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).7

Under these provisions of the Communications Decency Act, Sections
230 (c)(1) & (2) grant immunity to interactive computer services on the internet.8 Today, the most common interactive computer services are websites.9 Some of the most popular websites are networking platforms like
Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit,10 which are intermediaries that connect users
to each other through their platform.11 They are absolved from liability of
defamation because section 230 protects them from acting as publishers or
distributors.12
Under the common law, “a person who publishes a defamatory statement by another bears the same liability for the statement as if he or she had
initially created it.”13 Publishers have “the knowledge, opportunity, and abil6. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
7. Id. § 230(c)(2).
8. See id.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (1996) defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server.”
10. Priit Kallas, Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites and [2020],
https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-15-most-popular-social-networking-sites/
DREAMGROW,
(last updated Apr. 9, 2020).
11. KARINE PERSET, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 9 (2010), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/
44949023.pdf.
12. § 230(c)(1).
13. Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act, DIGITAL
MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishers-undercommunications-decency-act, (last visited Aug. 2, 2020).
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ity to exercise editorial control over the content of [their] publications.”14 A
book publisher, newspaper, or social media publishing website can each be
held liable for anything that appears within its pages.15
Moreover, that liability changes if the publisher becomes a distributor
because distributor liability is more limited.16 For example, if a grocery store
assumes liability for having celebrity tabloid publications in its stores, then
that grocery store would be liable to be sued for defamation by the celebrities, who appear in the tabloids. If this were the case, content like gossip
magazines and books would likely never see distribution due to the threat of
defamation lawsuits that would attach to the distributor.17
Similarly, if third-party publishers were to be held liable for the content
of their users, then lawsuits would accrue even more rapidly than they already do.18 To prevent these lawsuits, Congress enacted Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act in 1996, which granted immunity to thirdparty publishers.19 Thus, section 230 was enacted to ensure robust free
speech on the internet, “unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”20
However, unforeseen consequences have emerged from websites and
social media platforms on the internet as a result of section 230 immunity.21
For example, the inability to shield children from harmful images is one
consequence.22 Also, there have been instances of censorship by Twitter
banning viewpoints on their platform.23 In essence, section 230 immunity
has caused difficulty balancing factors between regulation and freedom of
expression.24
This article will examine the legislative history of section 230 and how
it affects the “modern public square”25—the internet. First, it will focus on
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 373, 481 (2010) (“[P]laintiffs continue to file lawsuits against intermediaries that are
shielded by section 230.”).
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
20. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
21. Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service
Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1279, 1295 (2010).
22. Id. at 1306–07 .
23. Matt Lamb, Google, Twitter and Facebook Should Just Be Honest If They Don’t
Like Conservatives, USA TODAY (Sep. 12, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/
2018/09/12/social-media-facebook-twitter-google-youtube-bias-conservatives-republicanscolumn/1250893002/.
24. See Ardia, supra note 18, at 410.
25. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
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the background and legislative history of section 230. This section will discuss two landmark cases that led to the creation of section 230—Cubby v.
CompuServe26 and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co.27 Next, the
article will examine the original legislative intent of Congressmen Cox and
Wyden, who were the framers of the Good Samaritan clause and who authored it in a bipartisan manner.
Additionally, the article will examine the censorship double-standards
on the internet, particularly on the Twitter platform, that have become so
common. This article will provide several concrete examples of how ISP’s
have engaged in viewpoint discrimination against certain users by blocking
them from their social media platforms and prohibiting those users from
exercising their fundamental First Amendment right to free speech.
Finally, this article will propose a couple of solutions to bridge this
conflict between the First Amendment and Section 230. The first of which
would be a legislative solution where Congress would create an additional
provision to the Good Samaratin Clause of Section 230 to make it clear that
if ISP’s want to keep their immunity from being liable for the content posted
by their users, then they must remain content-neutral and allow the full protections of the First Amendment. The provision will make it put forth the
notion that if ISP’s engage in viewpoint discrimination by blocking content
protected by the First Amendment, then the would have standing against the
website for violating their fundamental right to freedom of expression under
the First Amendment. Finally, this article will explain this solution would be
consistent with the legislative intent of Congressman Cox and Wyden, Judge
Buchwald’s ruling in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has described the internet as a “vast number of
documents stored in different computers all over the world.”28 The internet
has become the medium where the most amount of information is exchanged, and where most people in society go for entertainment and to
communicate with one another.29 As a result, content that is shared on the
internet should be protected from government regulation, unless the gov-

26. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
27. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., INDEX No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995).
28. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
29. Jana Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Positives of Digital Life, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY (July 3rd, 2018) https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/
07/03/the-positives-of-digital-life/.
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ernment can present a compelling state interest for intervening.30 Furthermore, the internet is operated by private companies, not the government,
who are “building and selling access” to the various domains whereby all of
this information is exchanged.31
Additionally, the most unique characteristic of the internet is its decentralized system, as it forces reliance amongst service providers, intermediaries, and third-party publishers.32 A “service provider” is “an entity offering
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user sent or received.”33 Service providers are essential to internet connectivity because
they facilitate the “instrumentalities that enable others to speak or act.”34
Thus, the interconnectivity between service provider networks is what essentially fuels the internet.35
Beginning in the 1990s, two New York state cases influenced the enactment of the Communications Decency Act and its section 230 provisions.
In 1991, Cubby v. CompuServe was one of the first cases involving a website that was sued for defamation based on the statements of a third-party.36
In that case, “CompuServe provided subscribers with access to . . . electronic ‘forums’ that were run by third parties.”37 Here, Cubby, Inc., the operator
and developer of a computerized database brought a suit for libel, business
disparagement, and unfair competition arising from CompuServe carrying in
its database a publication containing allegedly defamatory statements about
the plaintiffs.38 Cubby, Inc. based its claim on statements that appeared in
one of Compuserve’s forums, arguing that it was a publisher of the statements.39
However, CompuServe, in defense, argued it should be treated as a distributor rather than a publisher because it did not screen content before it
was posted. 40 The Court granted CompuServe’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to show that CompuServe “knew or had
30. Frieden, supra note 21, at 1306.
31. Nicholas P. Dickerson, Comment, What Makes the Internet So Special? And Why,
Where, How, and by Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 61, 69
(2009).
32. Ardia, supra note 18, at 384–85 (“[I]ntermediaries play many different roles.”).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A)–(B) (2020); see also Costar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.,
164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 701 (D. Md. 2001).
34. Ardia, supra note 18, at 393.
35. Id.
36. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); DIGITAL
MEDIA LAW PROJECT, supra note 13.
37. DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, supra note 12; Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 137.
38. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 137–38.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 139.
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reason to know” of the defamatory content.41 The Court looked at two contributing factors to determine that CompuServe was a distributor rather than
a publisher: (1) CompuServe’s contract gave it no editorial control over content; and (2) CompuServe was mostly a “passive conduit.”42 Thus, CompuServe was not held liable as a distributor of the defamatory statements.43
However, in 1995, the New York Superior Court noted in Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy, that Prodigy had the power to edit messages on its bulletin board forums.44 In Prodigy, the plaintiffs filed a libel action against
defendant internet service provider and alleged that defendant published
information on a computer bulletin board.45 Prodigy was a very similar service to CompuServe, and it was primarily a bulletin board forum.46 However, the plaintiff in Prodigy argued that Prodigy was liable for the information
because it had actually published the content.47 Here, the Court held that the
online service provider was a publisher rather than a distributor48 because
Prodigy exercised editorial control to filter content.49
Therefore, two New York courts, tasked with the same issue, came to
different conclusions as to whether internet service providers were to be
deemed publishers or distributors for liability purposes. The court in CompuServe held that the service provider was a distributor, and therefore,
CompuServe could not be held liable for the defamatory comments posted
in its forum unless they knew or had reason to know about the statements.50
In contrast, the Stratton Oakmont court held that the service provider was a
publisher because it exercised editorial control to filter content from its bulletin board forums.51 The Stratton Oakmont New York court opined that as a
publisher, the service provider could be held liable for defamatory comments posted on its bulletin board forum by a third party.52
Ultimately, the inconsistent rulings of CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont brought forth a need for legislation by Congress so that the internet
could thrive and grow into a robust, marketplace of ideas. The resulting legislation is known as the “Good Samaritan Clause” under provisions (c)(1) &
41. Id. at 137, 141–42.
42. Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH 253,
258–60 (2006).
43. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 137.
44. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., INDEX No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995).
45. Id at *1–2.
46. Id. at *2–3.
47. Id. at *6.
48. Id. at *10–11.
49. Id. at *3–5, 10.
50. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
51. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10–11.
52. Id. at *6.
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(2) in section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).53 It was a
reaction to the conflicting rationales in CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont
regarding whether the ISP was liable as a publisher or distributor.54 The legislature recognized a need for legislation that might bridge the gap between
the two cases and create a standard which would allow the internet to
grow.55 So it enacted section 230 and immunized third-party publishers from
liability for user content.56
After the enactment of the CDA, Congress amended the CDA to include sections (c)(1) & (2).57 Congress labeled the CDA amendments as
“Protection for Good Samaritan Blocking in Screening of Offensive Material.” Essentially, if a distributor or publisher of information or content blocks
or screens offensive material, section 230 gives it immunity.58 Under Section
230, offensive material is defined as “any action . . . that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”59 Because of this immunity, internet publishers are treated
differently from publishers in print, television or the radio.60
Shortly after the CDA was passed, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the act in Reno v. ACLU. In Reno, the Court struck down many
censorship provisions of the act. The Court found that (1) the CDA’s vague
provisions chilled free speech since speakers could not be certain if their
speech was proscribed; (2) that many of the CDA’s provisions criminalized
legitimate protected speech as well as unprotected obscene speech, and thus
were overinclusive; and (3) that the CDA was unconstitutional due to its
overbreadth.61 However, despite striking down some provisions of the act,
the Court left Section 230 untouched.62
One way to illustrate how ISPs are afforded extra protections under
Section 230 is to look at how platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are
protected from liability from tortious claims unlike traditional forms of press
such as the New York Times.63 Section 230 enables social media platforms to
connect more users now than ever before since they no longer have to be

53. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996).
54. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135; see also Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229.
55. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1996).
56. Id. § 230.
57. See id. § 230(c).
58. See id.
59. § 230(c)(2)(A).
60. Frieden, supra note 21, at 1307.
61. Id. at 849, 864, 870–72, 874, 879.
62. Id.
63. Frieden, supra note 21, at 1306–07.
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worried about being liable for the content that is posted on their websites.64
Some even argue that without Section 230, platforms like YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Yelp or Reddit would not exist since they all “allow ordinary
people to post opinions or write reviews.”65
Lastly, it is important to understand that Congress did not enact section
230 without limitations.66 The limitations contained in subsection 230(e)
provide no immunity for federal crimes and intellectual property law violations.67 For example, if a website blogger posts defamatory comments or
threats that violate criminal or intellectual property laws, they can be criminally prosecuted and sued for civil damages because they are liable for the
content.68 This limitation provides insight into Congress’s legislative intent
when drafting section 230; it illustrates that the drafters were willing to draw
certain brightline rules to avoid things such as criminal activity and trademark infringement.69
III. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATIVE INTENT FOR SECTION 230
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 70 the Court opined that the First
Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”71
Initially, section 230 of the CDA was not part of the original Senate legislative proposal, but was added in a proposed House Bill.72 The legislative intent of section 230 was “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media [and]
to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation.”73
Additionally, the act was passed because of the CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont odd outcomes on whether internet service providers that per64. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
65. Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield For Facebook, Google Is About to
Change, NPR (March 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/
591622450/section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change
66. Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027, 2043 (2018).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(2).
68. See id.
69. See Brands Must Police Trademark Infringement on eBay and Other Sites Themselves, VORYS ECONTROL: MARKETPLACE SOLUTIONS BLOG (MARCH 31, 2016), https://
www.onlinesellerenforcement.com/police-trademark-infringement/.
70. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
71. Id. at 270.
72. 140 CONG. REC. H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (amendment offered by Rep. Cox),
140 Cong. Rec. H 8425, at *H8468–69.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (1996).
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formed an editorial role regarding their customers, users, or subscribers,
effectively became content publishers.74 So, in 1996, Congress passed section 230 of the CDA in an effort led by Representatives Cox and Wyden to
shield internet service providers or intermediaries from any legal responsibility when a third party created content that results in a tort.75
To further understand the legislative intent of Congress, we must first
look to the case law. The first significant case to address section 230 of the
CDA came from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.76 In Zeran, the plaintiff was a customer of the
internet service provider, American Online (AOL), and sued it because of
delay in pulling down defamatory messages.77 The posting included the
plaintiff’s home phone number so that users would call and harass him.78 In
addition to suffering harassment, the plaintiff also received death threats.79
The plaintiff argued that AOL might be held liable if the court found it to be
a distributor rather than publisher.80 AOL argued it was immune under the
plain language set forth by section 230 because it was a third party that
posted the content that created the controversy.81 The court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument under the idea that distributor liability was the equivalent as publisher liability.82
Moreover, looking to the plain language of the statute, the court held
that section 230 did in fact immunize AOL and similar other service providers (e.g., third-party publishers or intermediaries).83 By providing this broad
immunity to service providers like AOL, “the court effectively disincentivized the self-censorship that Congress intended when it passed section 230
and overturned Stratton-Oakmont.”84 Thus, ISPs have no incentive to expend their resources regulating and censoring user content because they are
not liable for what their users or subscribers post on their websites.85 The
court reasoned that there are such a high number of posts to these ISPs that
74. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008).
75. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “even though
the CDA overall may have had the purpose of restricting content, there is little doubt that the
Cox-Wyden amendment, which added what ultimately became § 230 to the Act, sought to
further First Amendment and e-commerce interests on the Internet while also promoting the
protection of minors”).
76. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
77. Id. at 329.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 331.
81. Id. at 330.
82. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
83. Id. at 330.
84. Joseph G. Marano, Note, Caught in the Web: Enjoining Defamatory Speech that
Appears on the Internet, 96 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1318 (2018).
85. Id.
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it would be practically impossible for the intermediary (i.e., AOL) to screen
and censor them all.86 Hence, it would be both impractical and counterintuitive to the legislative intent behind section 230 if ISPs like AOL were forced
to choose what content to silence and restrict on their platforms. Such restrictions would inevitably lead to stifled rather than free speech on the internet.87
On the other hand, Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., is an exemplary case where
the court considered the legislative intent for the limits of section 230’s
reach.88 In Barnes, the plaintiff was a former girlfriend who sued Yahoo! for
failing to remove indecent content posted by the plaintiff’s former boyfriend.89 The plaintiff brought claims of negligent undertaking and promissory estoppel against Yahoo! for failing to remove the indecent content posted
by her former boyfriend.90 Similar to Zeran, the court had to consider
whether the legislature intended to only “override publisher theories of liability.”91 In Barnes, the Ninth Circuit barred the plaintiff from bringing the
negligent undertaking claim since ISPs could not be treated as publishers
under Section 230 of the CDA.92
However, the court in Barnes did allow the plaintiff to bring her promissory estoppel claim since it did not seek to hold the ISP liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content, but as a “counter-party to a contract”
who promised to remove the content and then breached the promise.93
Hence, a separate cause of action can be made for contract liability under
Section 230 where ISPs could still be liable for user content.94 This is because contract liability comes “not from [] publishing conduct, but from [the
ISP’s] manifest intent to be legally obligated to do something, which [in
Barnes] happen[ed] to be removal of material from publication.”95 Thus,
breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims are not precluded under
Section 230.96

86. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (“[T]he sheer number of postings on interactive computer
services would create an impossible burden in the Internet context.”).
87. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
88. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
89. Id. at 1098.
90. Id. at 1099, 1106.
91. Andrew P. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act at 20, 42 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 12 (2016).
92. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102–03 (“The duty that plaintiff claimed the ISP violated in the
negligent undertaking claim derived from the ISP’s conduct as a publisher.”).
93. Id. at 1107.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1109.
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Zeran was the first interpretation of section 230 where the court looked
to the legislative intent of Congress to interpret section 230.97 By narrowly
construing the wording of section 230, the court held AOL was not liable.98
Then ten years after Zeran, the Barnes court considered not only the legislative intent but also state-law theories of liability for internet service providers like Yahoo! that have immunity under section 230. 99 Thus, the court in
Barnes considered the issue of immunity on a case-by-case basis.100 Moreover, Rebecca Tushnet has explored the Congressional legislative intent behind the Good Samaritan provisions that grant immunity to intermediaries
like Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Rebecca Tushnet is a professor specializing in First Amendment jurisprudence at Harvard University School of
Law and is a foremost thinker in freedom of expression on the internet.101
Regarding the legislative intent behind section 230, Tushnet says, “Congress
believed that it needed to alter the common law, even more than it had been
modified by the First Amendment, to give Internet intermediaries the chance
to make their business models work.”102 This is to say: Congress needed to
create such safe harbors for major internet service providers so that the internet could thrive and grow.103 Therefore, the notion of promoting unfettered speech on the internet was the core intent of the legislators who drafted
section 230.104
Furthermore, courts have illustrated that, in addition to state-based theories as a work around to circumvent section 230, there could also be a federal remedy. In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether section 230 granted immunity to a website that
matched people to rent out spare rooms for people looking for a place to
live.105 Like some prominent intermediaries today, users filled out a profile,
as well as described themselves and their desired roommate in an “openended essay” format.106 The subscribers would choose from a level of services. Those who paid a monthly fee could also gain the ability to read

97. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997).
98. Id.
99. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100–02.
100. See generally id.
101. Rebecca Tushnet, Faculty Profiles, Harvard Law School, https://hls.harvard.edu/
faculty/directory/11412/Tushnet (last visited July 20, 2020).
102. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1008 (2008).
103. Id. at 1007–09.
104. Id. at 1010–11.
105. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (9th Cir.
2008).
106. See id. at 1161–62.
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emails from other users.107 The court held that the Roommates.com website
was entitled to immunity because it was an information content provider.108
However, the part of the website that encouraged users to provide additional comments did not violate section 230.109 So again, the court in Roommates.com turned to the legislative intent of section 230, stating in the opinion, “We believe that this distinction is consistent with the intent of Congress to preserve the free-flowing nature of Internet speech and commerce
without unduly prejudicing the enforcement of other important state and
federal laws.”110
Furthermore, in the case Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that it would be unconstitutional for a state
statute to prohibit registered sex offenders from accessing “commercial social networking Website[s]” that permit use by minors.111 In its analysis, the
Court denominated the internet, especially social media platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter, “the modern public square.”112 Thus, users should be
entitled to the First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and freedom of expression on the internet without the fear of censorship.113
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SECTION 230
The CDA has had its fair share of scrutiny.114 For example, Ryan J.P.
Dyer points out that, although in Barnes section 230 immunity was upheld,
the theory of state-based promissory estoppel was an effective remedy
against Yahoo!.115 Here, the emphasis on resolution through state-based
means provided a potential solution because the court considered it separately. Thus, if the legislative intent of section 230 is analyzed on a case-by-case
basis, this may be a more equitable solution when hearing new cases involving section 230.116
Although the early cases like Zeran, Barnes, and Roommates.com clarified some issues challenging internet service providers, it created others
surrounding censorship. Most notably, these censorship issues have arisen
107. See id. at 1162.
108. See id. at 1174.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1175.
111. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1731 (2017).
112. Id. at 1737.
113. Id.
114. Ryan J.P. Dyer, Comment, The Communication Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for
Renewing the Presumption Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837, 839 (2014).
115. Id. at 857 (stating “the ninth circuit reversed a district court ruling that the CDA
precluded a promissory estoppel claim after the defendant-website promised to remove a fake
profile of the plaintiff but then failed to do so”).
116. See Bolson, supra note 92, at 12.
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from the decision in Roommates.com because the court held that website
operators could be both a service provider and a content creator interchangeably.117 However, a third-party publisher may exercise “traditional
editorial functions” and still possess section 230 immunity.118 Also, a publisher may edit and publish material posted by users119 or encourage third
parties to post content on its site.120 And, as long as the third-party publisher
does not encourage illegal content or materially change the meaning of its
user content, then it is immune from liability.121 Thus, third-party publishers
do not lose immunity just because they help create the information by supplying a drop-down menu for the user to select preferences, unless those
preferences are discriminatory like in Roommates.com.122
However, if a third-party publisher creates a drop-down menu that indicates discriminatory selections, and as such is illegal by state or federal
laws, then it will lose the immunity granted forth by Section 230.123 Also,
third-party publishers do not have to pull down defamatory material unless
they have received notice that the material is defamatory and promised to
pull it down.124 This is especially true if the user relies on the promise of the
third-party publisher to remove the content, like in Barnes.125
Similar to the Roommates.com website, Facebook and Twitter are
third-party publishers because they develop and display user preferences by
publishing a profile page for each user on their websites. Once the thirdparty publisher publishes the user’s profile, then it becomes an “information
content provider.”126 “The term ‘information content provider’ means any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”127
A fundamental notion in First Amendment jurisprudence is that “[t]he
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary

117. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,1162–63 (9th Cir.
2008).
118. Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 725–26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
119. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
120. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
121. See Fair Hous. Council, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1175 (holding “[i]f you don’t encourage
illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be
immune”)
122. Fair Hous. Council, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1171, 1175.
123. Id. at 1175.
124. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2018).
127. Id.
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means to protect it.”128 But what if the information service provider, where
millions of Americans receive their information, is controlled by editorial
boards censoring viewpoints they deem objectionable?
Most often, content that is edited or banned by the information content
provider is referred to as “hate speech.”129 Under the First Amendment, there
is no unprotected category known as “hate speech,”130 but because providers
are private companies, there is no First Amendment violation. Instead of
offering dispute resolution and describing the exact language considered
offensive, intermediaries merely remove the content.131 There is a “laundry
list” of “content [that] could qualify as ‘otherwise objectionable’ under this
utterly subjective test.”132 The vague terminology of “hate speech” act as a
blanket excuse to club any speech the intermediary does not like.133
Certainly, it was not the legislative intent of section 230 to give companies a tool to silence speech.134 The immunity as defined by Section 230
for third-party publishers is not to be used for silencing viewpoints.135 Instead, the purpose of section 230 was just the opposite—it was intended to
allow more speech than ever before. In hindsight, it would have been impossible for Representatives Cox and Wyden to imagine that the internet would
become the massively intertwined conduit of information that it is today.
If the internet is “the modern public square,”136 then section 230 provides the largest social media websites like Facebook and Twitter a “license
[on] one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”137 Powerful platforms like Facebook
and Twitter have billions of users worldwide, and so they can use their superior position when censoring. The United States Court of Appeals for the
128. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
129. See, e.g., Ziad Reslan, It’s Time for Facebook and Twitter to Coordinate Efforts on
Hate Speech, TECHCRUNCH: EXTRA CRUNCH (Sept. 1, 2018, 4:36 PM), https://techcrunch.
com/2018/09/01/its-time-for-facebook-and-twitter-to-coordinate-a-joint-response-to-hatespeech/.
130. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 436 (1992) (Stephens, J., concurring in
judgment).
131. See, e.g., Tanya Dua, Vimeo Just Decided to Remove Content from InfoWars Conspiracy Theorist Alex Jones, BUSINESS INSIDER ( Aug. 12, 2018, 7:50 PM) https://www.
businessinsider.com/vimeo-is-the-latest-platform-to-remove-content-from-infowarsconspiracy-theorist-alex-jones-2018-8.
132. Dickerson, supra note 31, at 82.
133. Ben Shapiro, Facebook, YouTube, And Apple Ban Alex Jones. Here’s Why They’re
Dead Wrong, DAILY WIRE, (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.dailywire.com/news/34101/
facebook-youtube-and-apple-ban-alex-jones-heres-ben-shapiro.
134. Dickerson, supra note 31, at 82 (“Providing ISPs with such broad immunity from
liability is unnecessary, illogical, and counterproductive to Congress’s stated intent.”).
135. Shapiro, supra note 133.
136. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
137. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
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Ninth Circuit thought future courts would not have difficulty applying neutral tools to determine whether censorship to a user was necessary.138 But
intermediaries did not filter as much speech then as they do today. There
were not power platforms with editorial power over billions of users like
there is with Google, Facebook, and Twitter.
For instance, consider the possibility that major platforms have a double-standard when censoring speech, such as in the case of Sarah Jeong and
Candace Owens.139 Jeong, an Asian-American female, was hired by the New
York Times as a journalist after having prior racist tweets on her Twitter
account. She tweeted comments such as, “Dumbass . . . white people marking up the Internet with their opinions like dogs pissing on fire hydrants,”140
#CancelWhitePeople,”141 “White men are bullshit,”142 and “[I]t’s kind of
sick how much joy I get out of being cruel to old white men.”143 Also, she
tweeted, “White people have stopped breeding you will all go extinct soon
this was my plan all along.”144 Twitter never banned Sarah Jeong or even
suspended her for a brief time.145
At the same time that Jeong was hired to the editorial board for the
New York Times, Fox News correspondent Candace Owens copied and
paraphrased the racist tweets of Jeong on the platform.146 Owens replaced
Jeong’s tweets exactly, but changed the word “white” with the word “black”
or “Jewish” and the word “men” with “women.” She was subsequently
banned by Twitter for twelve hours.147 Her tweets were indistinguishable
from Jeong’s because they both included race and gender. Notably, Owens,
like Jeong, is a woman of color and female member of the media. In this
138. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (2008)
(“[T]here is no reason to believe that future courts will have any difficulty applying this principle. . . . We believe that this distinction is consistent with the intent of Congress to preserve
the free-flowing nature of Internet speech and commerce without unduly prejudicing the
enforcement of other important state and federal laws.”).
139. See generally Aja Romano, The “Controversy” Over Journalist Sarah Jeong Joining the New York Times, Explained, VOX (Aug. 3, 2018, 8:33 PM), https://www.vox.
com/2018/8/3/17644704/sarah-jeong-new-york-times-tweets-backlash-racism; see also Bret
Stephens, The Outrage Over Sarah Jeong, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/08/09/opinion/sarah-jeong-tweets-opinion-section.html.
140. Andrew Sullivan. When Racism Is Fit To Print. Intelligencer, (Aug. 3rd, 2018).
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/08/sarah-jeong-new-york-times-anti-white-racism.html
141. Natalia Mittelstadt, Twitter Bans Candace Owens for 12 Hours but Not Sarah Jeong
for Racist Tweets, CNSNEWS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/nataliamittelstadt/twitter-bans-candace-owens-12-hours-not-sarah-jeong-racist-tweets.
142. Stephens, supra note 139.
143. Id.
144. Mittelstadt, supra note 141.
145. See Sullivan, supra note 140.
146. Mittelstadt, supra note 141; see also Lamb, supra note 23.
147. Mittelstadt, supra note 141.
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case, Owens was blocked and Jeong was not, presumably because one was
of the same political affiliation as that of Twitter, while the other was not.
After the banning, Owens released a video explaining that she had copied
verbatim Jeong’s tweets and replaced certain words to illustrate Twitter’s
censorship double-standard.148 Twitter thereafter released her ban and issued
an apology claiming they “made an error” when banning Owens.149 The issue is that Twitter’s censor editorial board considered Owens’ language
abusive or threatening most likely because of her political affiliation, but
found Sarah Jeong’s to be acceptable.
There are several other examples of social media companies using their
censorship power to engage in viewpoint discrimination. One such example
includes Twitter banning users for “misgendering” people by referring to a
transgender individual by a different pronoun.150 One argument is that in
banning users stating a biological truth, Twitter is engaging in anti-scientific
viewpoint discrimination.151 Another argument is that it is cruel and
offensive to deadname152 a person.153 This last argument is the defense
Twitter uses to justify the banning of said users who offend the hateful conduct policy.154 The hateful conduct policy includes the “targeted misgendering or deadnaming of transgender individuals.”155 Hence, a user can be
banned from Twitter if the user deliberately refers to a transgender person
with the wrong pronoun or calls the person by the person’s pre-transition
name.156 In any case, it is dangerous to allow a censoring intermediary to
govern biological fact. Thus, this is yet another clear example of viewpoint
discrimination by Twitter, this time against scientific fact.157
A third example of viewpoint discrimination on Twitter was when
Twitter banned conservative activist Jacob Wohl for using bots to influence
an election; while left-wing activist Jonathon Morgan was not banned, even
though he was doing the same thing in Alabama.158 Here, Jacob Wohl was
148. Mittelstadt, supra note 141.
149. See Id.
150. Joe Rogan, Joe Rogan Experience #1258 - Jack Dorsey, Vijaya Gadde & Tim Pool,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZCBRHOg3PQ&t=1646s.
151. Id.
152. See Dictionary.com (“A deadname is the birth name of someone who has changed it.
The term is especially used in the LGBTQ community by people who are transgender and
elect to go by their chosen name instead of their given name.”) https://www.dictionary.
com/e/pop-culture/deadname/.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
156. Id.
157. Rogan, supra note 150.
158. Id.
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rightfully banned from using the Twitter platform for spreading misinformation about the 2020 election and for his plan to use bots to to influence
left-wing votes in the primaries towards candidates who he felt would be
weaker compared with Trump.159 However, Jonathon Morgan was not
banned from Twitter for his use of bots to try to destabilize the campaign of
Republican candidate Roy Moore in the 2018 midterm elections.160 This is a
situation where both individuals should have been banned from the platform
for attempting to influence an election through the use of bots, but instead
Twitter chose to censor only one side of the political spectrum.161
One final example of viewpoint discrimination on Twitter occurred
when the Proud Boys alt-right conservative group was banned on the platform for violence and hate, while the far-left anarchist Antifa are still allowed to operate.162 Here, Twitter banned the Proud Boys according to the
platform’s policy against violent extremist groups.163 However, Twitter still
allows many far-left Antifa groups to operate on its platform even though
they engage in the exact same violent political activities as the Proud
Boys.164 This situation is further compounded by the fact that reporter Andy
Ngo was actually violently attacked by members of Antifa who were counterprotesting during a Proud Boys rally.165 Ngo was brutally attacked and
beaten by a mob of Antifa to the point that he had to undergo neurophysical
therapy and speech therapy because of the beating,166 yet Antifa is still allowed to operate their violent group communication on Twitter.167 Hence,
this is just another instance where Twitter continues to selectively censor
groups that it disagrees with politically, as opposed to having some neutral
rule that would ban both groups for their violent and hateful acts.168
Silencing certain political viewpoints adverse to a platform’s editorial
board is not the legislative intent of section 230. But where do we draw the
line for the regulation of speech on our largest free-speech platforms, Face159. Greg Evans, Trump Supporter Jacob Wohl Banned from Twitter After Bragging
About Plans to Interfere in 2020 Election, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 27, 2019, 9:15 AM),
https://www.indy100.com/article/jacob-wohl-twitter-ban-trump-2020-election-republican8798926.
160. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race Imitated
Russian Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/
us/alabama-senate-roy-jones-russia.html.
161. Rogan, supra note 150.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Tess Bonn, Conservative Journalist Andy Ngo Says Assault Involving Antifa Resulted in Brain Injury, HILL (July 25, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/454712conservative-journalist-andy-ngo-says-antifa-attack-resulted-in-brain-injury.
166. Id.
167. Rogan, supra note 150
168. Id.
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book and Twitter? Does society continue to let platforms censor speech they
deem “otherwise objectionable”169 when that effect undoubtedly was not the
legislative intent of Congress?170 Congress should precisely define the language in Section 230 to provide for a category of speech that comports with
the First Amendment.
For now, intermediaries like Twitter and Facebook dictate the boundaries of speech on the internet based on their subjective interpretation of offensive or “otherwise objectionable.”171 The lack of neutrality issue is not
something Congress anticipated when drafting section 230. This is an extremely frightening predicament in modern society where social media platforms and other ISPs have so much control over speech. Here, ISPs are essentially acting as agents of the government in the way that they are shaping
the minds of the populace towards their own political agenda. Thus, section
230 and the First Amendment conflict the most because Congress’ legislative intent was not to silence speech, but instead to encourage interactive
computer services to “provide users neutral tools to post content online to
police that content without fear that . . . they [third-party publishers] would
become liable for every single message posted by third parties on their website.”172
V. ISSUE
This essay is going to address the conflict between the fundamental
right to free speech under the First Amendment and the Good Samaritan
Clause of Section 230 in the Communications Decency Act. This is a prevalent issue today in the Trump-era where social media outlets have been taking advantage of the divisiveness present in society by controlling the narrative and censoring certain viewpoints so that they can push their own agenda
to the public. This issue is an unintended one as the legislative intent of the
Section 230 was to not only shield private ISPs from liability for the posts,
but it was also actually supposed to encourage free speech and the flow of
the marketplace of ideas since ISPs would no longer have to be fearful of
being liable for the posts of their users. However, in reality it has had the
exact opposite effect as social media outlets have used the Good Samaritan
Clause to go beyond just shielding themselves from liability and into the
realm of silencing certain viewpoints and controlling the ideas that are presented to their users.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Dickerson, supra note 31, at 82.
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Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
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This is extremely problematic in today’s society due to the prevalence
of ISPs that have major censorship powers as a result of the rise of social
media. The internet and ISPs have been around for decades, but it is the rise
of social media as the modern public square where individuals express their
personal and political views that has exposed the conflict between free
speech and Section 230 when those social media platforms take it upon
themselves to engage in viewpoint discrimination and censor the content of
certain users. This is an extremely frightening predicament in modern society where social media platforms and other ISPs have so much control over
the political narrative. Here, ISPs are basically acting as agents of the government in the way that they are shaping the minds of the populace towards
their own political agenda. Both the courts and legislators have attempted to
address this issue, with cases such as the Knight First Amendment Institute
v. Trump, and the Mark Zuckerberg Senate hearings in April 2018. However, none of these options were sufficient in and of themselves, nor were they
able to solve the conflict between the right to free speech under the First
Amendment and the Good Samaritan Clause Section 230. Therefore, this
essay is going to provide two possible solutions that would bridge this conflict of censorship by preventing social media outlets from engaging in
viewpoint discrimination on their platforms.
VI. SOLUTION
In this case, the best possible solution to solve the conflict between
Section 230 of the CDA and the First Amendment would be for Congress to
introduce legislation that would amend the statute. Congress needs to pass
legislation indicating that if ISPs engage in viewpoint discrimination and
censor user content that is protected by the first amendment, then those injured users would have standing against the ISPs.
A legislative solution to resolving the issue of viewpoint discrimination
on the internet is the default one. Here, Congress would address this issue by
adding a provision into Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
that would grant a constitutional cause of action to all users who are victims
of viewpoint discrimination on the internet. This added provision would
make it clear that if ISPs engage in viewpoint discrimination by blocking
user content that is protected by the First Amendment, then those very same
users would be able to bring a cause of action against those website owners
for violating their fundamental right to freedom of expression under the First
Amendment. Thus, the immunity granted to ISPs from being held liable for
third party content posted on their websites would be stripped away from
them for each individual case that is brought against them where they engaged in viewpoint discrimination and censored user content that is protected by the First Amendment.
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This added provision would align with the legislative intent of Congressman Cox and Wyden who originally drafted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in 1997. The legislative intent of Section 230 was
to actually promote free speech on the internet by shielding ISPs from liability for third-party content posted on their websites.173 However, the unintended consequence that the drafters didn’t anticipate was that the Good
Samaritan Clause of Section 230 actually enabled ISPs to engage in unnecessary regulation and viewpoint discrimination by censoring content from
their users even though that content is protected by the First Amendment.
This solution would evolve the Good Samaritan Clause of Section 230
in a way that would help it accomplish its original goals of both shielding
ISPs from liability for the content posted on their websites and promoting
free speech on the internet. It would accomplish these goals by keeping the
ISPs with censorship power such as the big social media companies honest
by taking away their Section 230 immunity for each individual case in
which they engage in viewpoint discrimination or censor user content that is
protected by the First Amendment. The injured user who was unnecessarily
blocked or censored may then pierce the shield of immunity provided by
Section 230 and bring a First Amendment cause of action against the website.
The provision would also make it clear that an ISP would only be allowed to block or censor a user on their website if that user is posting content that is not protected by the First Amendment. It would explicitly state
that an ISP can only block user content on their websites for the following
unprotected content under the freedom of expression clause of the First
Amendment: (1) Fighting Words; (2) Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action; (3) Obscenity; (4) Defamation (Libel/Slander); (5) True Threats; (6)
Perjury; (7) Blackmail; and (8) Solicitation to Commit Crimes.174
This tweak to the Good Samaritan Clause of Section 230 would enable
ISPs to keep their Section 230 immunity while at the same time rein in the
amount of viewpoint discrimination that social media platforms engage in
by opening them to suit and lifting their Section 230 immunity for each individual case where they censor user content that is protected by the First
Amendment. The list of content that is unprotected by the First Amendment
is expansive enough, and this added provision would ensure that the major
social media companies would not be able to go beyond that list and engage
in viewpoint discrimination without opening themselves up to liability.
Additionally, this added provision would be able to circumvent any arguments from the social media companies that state that they should be al173. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)–(c) (2018).
174. See Unprotected Speech Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.
uslegal.com/u/unprotected-speech/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).

2020]

SECTION 230 IMMUNITY

259

lowed to control the content on their privately-owned websites due to the
Supreme Court comment in Packingham v. North Carolina, that labelled the
internet as the “modern day public square.”175 Moreover, it would also be
consistent with Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v.
Trump, referenced earlier, that ruled that President Trump’s Twitter profile
was a designated public forum and forced him to unblock users who criticized his policies.176
Thus, adding this provision to Section 230 would not only prevent
viewpoint discrimination against certain users, but it would lead to the promotion of free speech on the internet, which was the original legislative intent of the drafters in the first place. Additionally, the provision would be
consistent with recent Supreme Court rulings that have labelled the internet
as the modern public square.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress’s legislative intent for section 230(c) was to
promote speech on the internet in an unabridged fashion.177 The Good Samaritan clause that Representatives Cox and Wyden authored together in a
bipartisan manner was to provide immunity for third-party publishers
against liability arising from a third party.178 Additionally, it was supposed
to “promote the continued development of the internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media [and] to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”179
Congress did not intend for section 230 to be used as a censor to silence
viewpoints. However, contrary to the legislative intent, intermediaries, do
just that.
The solution proposed in this article suggests that Congress should add
a provision to Section 230 of the CDA that would open ISPs such as Facebook and Twitter up to liability if they engage in viewpoint discrimination
by censoring user content protected by the First Amendment. This will
achieve the original intent of the drafters of Section 230 by encouraging free
speech on internet. Additionally, Solution A would align with the rulings in
Packingham v. North Carolina and Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University v. Trump that labelled the internet as the modern pub-

175. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
176. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
575 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
177. See § 230(c)(1).
178. See § 230(c)(2).
179. See § 230(b).
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lic square. Thus, if the solution above is followed, then the original intent of
the drafters of section 230 can finally be realized.

